





























































We explore the impact of concentration in the banking markets on the capital
structure of publicly quoted non-￿nancial ￿rms in the EU15 over the period 1997-
2005, an era marked by intensive merger activity in the banking sector. Our main
￿nding is a negative and signi￿cant relationship between the degree of concentra-
tion of European bank markets and the market leverage of ￿rms, indicating the
persistence of credit constraints. This ￿nding is robust when we use behavioral
measures of bank conduct. This support for the market power hypothesis indicates
that further measures are needed to make bank lending more competitive.
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11 Introduction
The positive role of the banking sector in enhancing economic growth through
a more e¢ cient resource allocation has been widely documented (Levine and
Zervos (1998)). Since banks are important suppliers of funds to ￿rms, the
structure of bank markets as well as the e⁄ects of market structure changes
on the lending behavior of banks may have an impact on the access of ￿rms to
bank ￿nance. It is, however, unclear how bank market structure changes may
a⁄ect the access of non-￿nancial ￿rms to bank lending (Black and Strahan
(2002)). More concentrated banking markets have been found to lead to lower
growth, except for industries that depend heavily on external ￿nance (Cetorelli
and Gambera (2001)). In this paper we examine empirically whether changes
in the structure of European bank markets a⁄ect the access of non-￿nancial
￿rms to bank ￿nance. More speci￿cally, we investigate the relationship be-
tween the degree of concentration of European bank markets and the capital
structure of non-￿nancial ￿rms.
Banks have been and remain the dominant source of debt ￿nancing for
European companies. During the last decade, the European banking sector
has been characterized by a wave of mergers and acquisitions, predominantly
in the form of domestic consolidation (ECB (2006)). The result has been a
substantial increase in the measured level of bank market concentration in
most countries. Similarly, European bond and stock markets have witnessed
a pronounced development and integration since the introduction of the Euro
(Rajan and Zingales (2003)). These developments in the bank and ￿nancial
markets make the period under consideration, 1997-2005, and the geographical
scope (EU15) particularly interesting to investigate the impact of the evolving
2market structure of ￿nancial intermediaries on external ￿nancing decisions by
non-￿nancial ￿rms.
By investigating the relationship between bank market concentration and
￿rm leverage this paper relates to the empirical corporate ￿nance literature
(Rajan and Zingales (1995), Fama and French (2002), Flannery and Rangan
(2006)). The paper contributes to two strands of this empirical literature.
The ￿rst is the recent literature which examines how the supply of external
￿nance a⁄ects the corporate ￿nance behavior of companies (Faulkender and
Petersen (2006), Leary (2005), Lemmon and Roberts (2007)). Bank loans play
a less important role in the ￿nancing of large U.S. companies (Danthine et al.
(2002), Saidenberg and Strahan (1999)), therefore these papers do not inves-
tigate bank loan ￿nancing 1 . We argue that the EU countries are a well suited
geographical area to examine the role of bank loan supply because domestic
mergers and acquisitions have fundamentally altered the market structure of
banking under the period of investigation. This allows us to exploit both time
and cross-country variation to examine the role of bank loan ￿nancing on the
capital structure of ￿rms. Moreover, since the introduction of the Euro, bonds
and equity have become more important alternatives for external ￿nance next
to bank loans in the EU. Therefore, we can account for the increasing compe-
tition between banks and ￿nancial markets.
A second line of corporate ￿nance literature investigates the role of institu-
tions on corporate ￿nancing choices (Demirg￿￿-kunt and Maksimovic (1999),
Giannetti (2003), Fan et al. (2006)). We contribute to this evidence by instru-
menting the observed bank market structures using measures of competition
1 An exception is Leary (2005) who uses two natural experiments from the 1960s.
3policy from Carletti et al. (2008). Our ￿nal contribution relates to the litera-
ture which examines the role of bank market structure on the external ￿nance
behavior of companies (Petersen and Rajan (1995), Zarutski (2006)). First,
we examine listed companies instead of small and medium-sized companies.
Second, we use not only the usual concentration measures (HHI, CR5) but
also behavioral measures (Lerner index and Boone indicator).
The sample period covers sub-periods characterized by di⁄erent business
cycle conditions, so that our results are not driven by speci￿c macroeconomic
conditions. Methodologically, as in Faulkender and Petersen (2006), we at-
tempt to integrate demand and supply factors that may a⁄ect leverage deci-
sions by non-￿nancial corporations. Furthermore, we exploit the panel struc-
ture of the data by using a sample of individual ￿rms across di⁄erent years,
allowing us to use ￿rm ￿xed e⁄ects (Lemmon, Roberts and Zender (2006)).
Our main ￿nding is a negative and signi￿cant relationship between the de-
gree of competition in the European bank markets and the market leverage
of ￿rms, implying that increased concentration of bank markets imposes an
external debt ￿nance constraint on non-￿nancial ￿rms. These ￿ndings are ro-
bust when we use behavioral measures of bank competition, instead of the
traditional market structure indicators. Our ￿ndings strengthen the case for
further regulatory action aimed at stimulating competition in European bank-
ing markets.
In the next section we state the main hypotheses: the information-based
hypothesis and the market power hypothesis. The empirical strategy which
integrates the demand and supply factors for corporate leverage is outlined
in Section 3. We then present our data on listed non-￿nancial ￿rms, di⁄erent
4bank market structure variables and measures of alternative external ￿nance
(section 4). In section 5 we examine the determinants of leverage and the im-
pact of our measures of market structure. The bank market structure variables
are instrumented and we check the robustness of the results. We conclude in
Section 6 and present broader implications of our ￿ndings.
2 Determinants of corporate leverage: supply and demand factors
This paper examines the e⁄ect of bank market concentration on the avail-
ability of bank loans to non-￿nancial ￿rms. The literature has identi￿ed two al-
ternative hypotheses, the market power hypothesis and the information-based
hypothesis. Banks have an informational advantage over public lenders. Higher
bank market concentration may make banks more e¢ cient and strengthen this
information advantage, thereby inducing banks to invest more in relationships.
This should mitigate the asymmetric information problem which is the main
cause for credit rationing (Stiglitz and Weiss (1981)) and therefore lead to
more lending and hence, to higher observed levels of corporate leverage. We
call this the information-based hypothesis. The alternative hypothesis is the
market power explanation. Several theories predict a negative e⁄ect of bank
consolidation on the availability of loans. A non-￿nancial company which is
confronted with a concentrated banking market may face less attractive loan
conditions when banks e⁄ectively use their market power. As a result ￿rms
will decrease their use of bank debt and exhibit lower leverage, assuming
the absence of alternatives for external debt ￿nance. We call this the mar-
ket power hypothesis. Previous empirical studies have reported mixed results.
On the one hand Petersen and Rajan (1994) and Zarutskie (2006) ￿nd sup-
5port for the information-based hypothesis. Petersen and Rajan (1994) ￿nd
that a change in the bank market Hirschmann-Her￿ndahl Index (HHI) of 0.1
increases the ratio Total Debt/Assets of a typical ￿rm by 0.36 percent. Zarut-
skie￿ s (2006) main ￿nding is that the ￿rm Outside Debt/ Assets increases by
between 0.19 and 0.77 percent following an increase in HHI of 0.1. On the
other hand Carb￿-Valverde et al. (2006) examine ￿rm borrowing constraints
for a sample of Spanish small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs). They use
an alternative measure of concentration, the Lerner index, and ￿nd support
for the market power hypothesis.
Most research on the e⁄ect of bank concentration on lending originates
from the U.S. Moreover, research has concentrated on privately-held ￿rms,
more speci￿cally SMEs, both for the U.S. and other countries. There are solid
economic reasons to focus on SMEs: they are smaller, they are more opaque
and hence characterized by larger informational asymmetry and they are more
dependent on bank ￿nancing for their investment than large public ￿rms,
suggesting that the e⁄ects of bank competition should be more pronounced for
SMEs (Berger et al. (2005)). In this study we focus on listed European ￿rms
because we use market leverage as the dependent variable, which requires
data on the market value of the ￿rms under investigation. We argue that
this strategy can yield useful results because European ￿rms, even the larger
ones, are still heavily dependent on bank ￿nancing. If anything, should we
￿nd lending constraints due to the bank market structure for listed ￿rms, this
would only strengthen the similar case for SMEs. Another important aspect is
the geographical market de￿nition of the banking sector. While studies for the
U.S. are able to use more re￿ned concentration measures, we have to rely on
country-based measures of bank market structure. However, this geographic
6market de￿nition should not introduce a bias, because for most ￿rms the
country level can be considered as the relevant market. Numerous studies have
investigated the level of ￿nancial integration in Europe and although there is
considerable progress in some segments, the banking markets are found to
be not fully integrated (Baele et al. (2004)). Furthermore, if the European
market were completely integrated, this would work against ￿nding an e⁄ect
of country-speci￿c bank concentration on the capital structure of non-￿nancial
￿rms. Not only the size of the ￿rm is important, the size of banks has also
been found to impact the lending behavior of banks. Berger et al. (2005) ￿nd
that bigger banks are more apt to lend to ￿rms that are larger or that have
better accounting records. It should be noted that the ￿rms in their study are
also relatively small. The biggest ￿rms in their study are the smallest ￿rms in
our sample. Therefore, it is not clear whether we can assume that the results
of Berger et al. (2005) carry over to our sample of listed ￿rms.
The main property of bank lending for the information-based hypothesis
is relationship lending, which is seen as the raison d￿ Œtre of banks since re-
lationships may mitigate informational asymmetries (Diamond (1984), James
(1987)). Ongena and Smith (2000) document large cross-country variation in
the average number of bank relationships in large ￿rms across 20 European
countries. Firms maintain more relationships in countries with unconcentrated
but stable banking systems and active bond markets. However, there has been
no consensus on the e⁄ect of bank concentration on relationship lending (Boot
(2000)). Chan et al. (1986) argue that more competition in the banking mar-
ket implies less relationship banking, since borrowers might be tempted to
switch to other banks or to the bond or stock market. Banks then anticipate
that relationships have a shorter lifespan and invest less in relationships. A
7complementary negative e⁄ect of competition on relationship banking may
come from the impact of competition on the intertemporal pricing of loans.
Increased credit market competition could impose constraints on the ability
of borrowers and lenders to share surpluses intertemporally. Therefore, banks
will not fund young corporations (Petersen and Rajan, 1995). This suggests
that competition leads to less lending. An alternative view is that compe-
tition may elevate the importance of relationships as a distinct competitive
edge. Boot and Thakor (2000) show that a relationship orientation can alle-
viate pressure on pro￿t margins. As a relationship banking orientation can
make a bank more unique relative to competitors, interbank competition may
increase the value of relationship banking. Hence theory does not provide a
consensus on the interaction between relationship lending and concentration.
The market power and information-based hypotheses focus on the supply
of bank loans. However, in our empirical setup, we control explicitly for the
demand of external ￿nance and incorporate the ￿rm characteristics which
have been found in the corporate ￿nance literature to explain capital struc-
ture behavior. While the predictions of these characteristics are discussed in
the next section, we now examine those ￿rm properties, namely collateral and
size, which have been found to interact with bank concentration. Collateral is
closely related to relationship lending as bank loan contracts can easily accom-
modate collateral requirements. An extensive theoretical literature shows that
collateral can mitigate moral hazard and adverse selection problems in loan
contracting (Shan and Thakor (1987), Stiglitz and Weiss (1981)). However,
collateral is likely to be e⁄ective only if its value can be monitored (Rajan and
Winton (1995)). Besanko and Thakor (1987) show that competition lowers
the rents of lenders and suggest that the use of collateral is more likely with
8competition than monopoly. However, bank concentration does not seem to
alter the lender￿ s incentives to invest in information. Where the theoretical
literature provides no consensus, empirical work by Jimenez, Salas & Saurina
(2006) suggests that there is a negative relationship between collateral and
bank concentration. Finally, while the relevant market de￿nition for Euro-
pean ￿rms is the country level, we expect that the largest ￿rms in our sample
will have a truly European scope and bank concentration on the country level
will therefore not impact those ￿rms. As a result, we conjecture that the in-
teraction between bank concentration and size will have the opposite sign of
the e⁄ect of bank concentration.
In our empirical setup we also account for the alternatives to bank loans,
i.e. market-based corporate ￿nancing such as bonds and equity. Rajan and
Zingales (1995) examine large companies and ￿nd that the ￿rm characteris-
tics that explain capital structure in the U.S. also explain leverage in the other
countries. While they ￿nd that whether companies are from a bank-based or
a market-based country does not a⁄ect the level of leverage, their results sug-
gest that bank versus market orientation leads to di⁄erences in the relative
amounts of private ￿nancing (bank loans) and arms-length ￿nancing through
market securities. However, the importance of banking markets has been found
to a⁄ect the level of leverage. Demirg￿￿-Kunt, and Maksimovic (1999) use the
ratio of the domestic assets of deposit banks to GDP to examine the impact of
access to ￿nancial intermediaries and ￿nd that countries with larger banking
systems have lower ratios of corporate net ￿xed assets to total assets. They
further argue that di⁄erences in the ￿nancial institutions between countries
a⁄ect non-￿nancial ￿rms￿leverage. Fan, Titman, and Twite (2006) use the
supply of funds that are available to the banking sector, assuming that the
9amount of funds that ￿ ows to the banking sector can be viewed as exogenous.
They ￿nd that the bank sector in￿ uences the capital structure choice of ￿rms
as banks prefer o⁄ering their borrowers shorter maturity debt. Finally, Gian-
netti (2003) examines both listed and unlisted companies from eight countries
in the EU for the period 1993-1997. The measures of the development of the ￿-
nancial markets, which includes a measure for bank concentration, are argued
to proxy not only for the availability of equity and market debt in a country,
but also to be indirect measures of the importance of banks. She ￿nds that
bank concentration has a signi￿cant negative impact on ￿rm debt, "perhaps
in order to escape banks￿market power" (p. 208).
3 Empirical strategy
Faulkender and Petersen (2006) argue that information asymmetry and
agency problems are the market frictions that make capital structure choices
relevant but also imply that ￿rms are sometimes rationed by their lenders.
Thus, when explaining a ￿rm￿ s leverage, it is important to include not only
the determinants of its preferred leverage (the demand side) but also the vari-
ables that measure the constraints on a ￿rm￿ s ability to increase its leverage
(the supply side). Therefore, we follow their empirical strategy, since we focus
our analysis on one particular supply side factor, i.e. bank market structure.
To examine the role of credit constraints and help explore the di⁄erence be-
tween the public debt markets (e.g., bonds) and bank debt, we consider the
leverage of ￿rms to be a function of the concentration in the bank market and
alternatives to bank loans such as (the development of) the bond market and
the equity market. The observed level of debt is a function of the supply of
10debt and the ￿rm￿ s demand for debt, both of which depend on the price of
debt capital and supply and demand factors.
Qdemand = ￿0Price + ￿1Xdemandfactors + "demand (1)
Qsupply = ￿0Price + ￿1Xsupply factors + "supply (2)
If there are no supply frictions, ￿rms can borrow as much debt as they want
(at the correct price), and the observed level of debt will equal the demanded
level. This is the traditional assumption in the empirical capital structure
literature. Only demand factors explain variation in the ￿rms￿debt levels,
where demand factors are any ￿rm characteristic that raises the net bene￿t of
debt.
However, if ￿rms without access to public debt markets are constrained in
the amount of debt that they may issue (private lenders do not fully replace
the lack of public debt), or when they face concentrated banking markets, they
will have lower leverage ratios, even after controlling for the ￿rm￿ s demand for
debt. Equating the demand and supply, we can express the above equations
as two reduced form equations ￿one for quantity and the other for price ￿so
that each is a function of the demand and supply factors.
Qobserved = ￿DXdemandfactors + ￿SXsupply factors + ￿ (3)
We use a measure of bank market structure or bank conduct to capture the
external ￿nancing constraints imposed by the access to bank loans. As stated
11before, theory provides mixed arguments leading to two opposing hypotheses.
On the one hand, higher bank market concentration may lead to more bank
￿nancing under the information-based hypothesis. On the other hand, con-
centration may be associated with less bank ￿nancing when the market power
hypothesis holds. We control for two alternatives, bond ￿nancing and equity
issuing. We expect that bond ￿nancing will be positively linked with leverage
since ￿rms can turn to the ￿nancial markets if the bond market is well devel-
oped. With respect to equity issuing, ￿rms will be able to issue equity more
easily if the stock market is well developed. As a result they will have lower
leverage.
The demand factors are captured by the ￿rm characteristics. Several factors
have been found to have a robust correlation with cross-sectional di⁄erences in
leverage (Frank and Goyal (2005)). Leverage is positively related to tangibility,
size and median industry leverage, whereas it is negatively related to growth
opportunities and pro￿tability. Tangibility captures the presence of ￿xed assets
which are easier to collateralize. Therefore, ￿rms remain more valuable when
they go into distress, hence ￿rms with a lot of collateralizable assets will ￿nd
it easier to obtain bank loans. Furthermore, the agency costs for ￿rms with
high tangible asset ratios are lower, as collateral makes it more di¢ cult for
shareholders to substitute high-risk assets for low-risk ones. The next factor is
size. Large ￿rms will have more debt since larger ￿rms are more diversi￿ed and
have lower default risk. Larger ￿rms are also typically more mature ￿rms that
have a reputation in debt markets and consequently face lower agency cost of
debt. Finally, median industry leverage re￿ ects a number of otherwise omitted
common factors and in a trade-o⁄ setting, the industry median debt ratio is
likely to be a proxy for the target capital structure. The growth opportunities
12of the ￿rm are negatively correlated with leverage since growing ￿rms are
assumed to lose more of their value when they go into distress. Furthermore
agency costs, which can arise due to underinvestment, asset substitution or
free cash ￿ ow are mitigated to a large extent in growth ￿rms. Finally, the
negative correlation found for ￿rm pro￿tability is usually ascribed to lower
expected bankruptcy costs and more valuable interest tax shields. Firms that
generate higher pro￿ts relative to investments also bene￿t form the discipline
that debt provides in mitigating the free cash ￿ ow problem (agency cost). In
our empirical setup, we include all these ￿ stylized￿demand factors (Rajan and
Zingales (1995), Fama and French (2002), Flannery and Rangan (2006)) next
to the supply e⁄ect of bank market concentration to explain the variation in
corporate leverage.
4 Data
The sample of non-￿nancial ￿rms is constructed from Amadeus, a pan-
European ￿nancial database that provides detailed balance sheet and income
data for companies in Europe and standardized balance sheet information
with the stated objective of achieving uniformity and enabling cross-border
analysis. We select all consolidated 2 listed ￿rms of the EU15 for the period
2 Except for Greece where no consolidated data is available. We also run the re-
gressions without Greece, the results remain unaltered.
131996-2005 3 4 . This sample of ￿rms is merged with market data from Datas-
tream, we use the ISIN code of the ￿rm as identi￿er. To reduce the impact
of outliers we winsorize the sample at the 1st and 99th percentile. We delete
all observations for which one of the variables is missing, this leads to the
exclusion of ￿rms from Denmark for which no loan data is available and the
￿rms from Luxembourg for which no data on private bond capitalization is
available 5 . The ￿nal sample is an unbalanced sample of 3364 ￿rms and 19735
￿rm-year observations. Table 1.A presents an overview of the ￿rm-speci￿c vari-
ables used in our empirical analysis to capture the demand side together with
their sources. The construction of the variables is standard in the literature
(Rajan and Zingales (1995), Flannery and Rangan (2006)). The dependent
variable used in the analysis is market leverage which is constructed as the ra-
tio of debt, both short and long term, over the sum of debt and market value of
the ￿rm (Flannery and Rangan (2006)). We also use book leverage, de￿ned as
the ratio of debt over total assets, but this leads to similar qualitative results.
The supply side is measered using several indicators of bank concentration
and bank conduct at the country level (Table 1.B), as well as alternative
sources of external ￿nance (Table 1.C). The ECB provides yearly concentra-
tion ￿gures for the EU15 from 1997 onwards in their reports on EU bank-
3 From this sample we exclude all ￿nancial ￿rms with NACE Rev 1.1 code 65 ￿ Fi-
nancial intermediation, except insurance and pension funding￿ , 66 ￿ Insurance and
pension funding, except compulsory social security￿ , 67 ￿ Activities auxiliary to ￿-
nancial intermediation￿and regulated ￿rms, NACE Rev 1.1 code 75 ￿ Public admin-
istration and defense; compulsory social security￿ .
4 We use several updates of Amadeus to mitigate attrition problems.
5 When we include both countries in the base regressions, the results remain the
same.
14ing structure (ECB, EU Banking Structures, 2007). The ￿rst measure is the
Hirschmann-Her￿ndahl index (HHI), calculated as the sum of the squares of
the credit institutions￿market shares, according to total assets. Our second
measure is the CR5, which is the share of the 5 largest credit institutions in
total assets in each country. The HHI ranges from 0 to 10000 where 0 indicates
perfect competition and 10000 would indicate a monopoly. The assumption
is that concentration leads to less competition as there are less players in the
market and therefore, the remaining players can exercise market power.
However, banks are special in nature and it has been suggested that the
standard paradigm, that higher concentration leads to market power (Bain
(1956)), may not be appropriate for the banking industry (see Degryse and
Ongena (2005)). Due to asymmetric information inherent in bank lending,
banking competition may have a ￿ special nature￿(Carletti (2005)). Therefore,
in addition to HHI and CR5, which are well known and widely used concentra-
tion measures, we use two alternatives measures of the observable competitive
behavior of banks, i.e. the Lerner index and the Boone indicator, as robust-
ness checks. The Lerner index is intended to measure the degree of competition
based on the observed pricing behavior of banks (the indicator is calculated
as (price ￿marginal cost)/price). The index can take values between 0 and 1,
where zero stands for perfect competition and 1 for monopoly power. There-
fore, a positive sign would lend support for the information-based hypothesis
whereas a negative sign would provide support for the market power hypoth-
esis. Using the Lerner index, FernÆndez de Guevera et al. (2007) ￿nd support
for a negative relationship between concentration and competition. FernÆndez
De Guevara and Maudos (2004) calculate this measure for all the countries
in our sample, however only until 2000. The Boone indicator measures the
15e⁄ect of e¢ ciency in terms of marginal cost on market shares. The rationale is
that competition enhances the performance of e¢ cient ￿rms (lower marginal
cost) which will lead to higher market shares. Moreover, this e⁄ect is assumed
to be positively correlated with competition, hence the stronger competition
is, the more negative the Boone indicator will be. Therefore, the interpreta-
tion of the impact of the measure will be similar to that of the Lerner index
where a positive (negative) impact lends support to the information-based hy-
pothesis (market power hypothesis). Van Luevensteijn, Bikker, van Rixtel and
Kok-Słrensen (2007) apply the measure to the banking market and single out
the behavior of commercial banks, which are the most relevant banks when
considering the ￿nancing of listed ￿rms. The Boone indicator is available for
France, Germany, Italy, Spain, Netherlands and UK for the period 1997 to
2004. Therefore, all large countries in our sample are accounted for together
with one of the countries that has the highest concentration in terms of HHI
and CR5 6 .
Alternative sources to bank ￿nancing are included using three indicators of
￿nancial market development; two are obtained from the Financial Develop-
ment and Structure database of the World Bank and one from Datastream.
We use private bond market capitalization to GDP, calculated as the ratio of
private domestic debt securities as a share of GDP, as a proxy for the develop-
ment of the bond market, and a measure of stock market development, i.e. the
6 An alternative measure of bank behavior would be the Panzar-Rosse measure.
Bikker and Haaf (2002) calculate this H-statistic for 23 European and non-European
countries and ￿nd support for the conventional view that concentration impairs
competition. However, we lack su¢ cient data for this measure to apply it in our
panel data framework.
16value of listed shares to GDP to proxy for the development of stock markets.
Our ￿nal measure of access to external ￿nance is obtained checking ￿rm by
￿rm whether they issue bonds using the bond module in Datastream. This
provides us with a dummy which has value one starting from the year that
the ￿rm issues a bond. We include this dummy to explicitly account for one
particular outside ￿nancing option using the fact that some ￿rms e⁄ectively
use bond ￿nancing, whereas others do not.
Finally, we include robustness measures (Table 1.D) such as a contestability
measure of national bank markets in order to capture the potential competition
banks face in their home markets. This approach is supported by Claessens
and Laeven (2004) who ￿nd no evidence that bank sector concentration has
a negative e⁄ect on competition in a sample of 50 countries, but report that
contestability determines e⁄ective competition. The measure of contestability
is the share of total assets of foreign branches and subsidiaries relative to the
total assets of the banking sector in a particular country. Total bank assets are
obtained from the ECB report on banking structures (2007). The relative size
of foreign branches and subisiduaries measures the incidence of foreign entry of
banks, which should increase the pressure on the incumbent banks to behave
more competitively. Hence, we expect a positive impact of contestability on
the leverage of non-￿nancial ￿rms.
In table 2, column 1 and 2, we report the mean of the two concentration
measures (HHI and CR5) for the period 1997-2005 and their percentage change
between 1997 and 2005 in each country in the sample. There is considerable
heterogeneity among the European countries. Moreover, the percentage change
in HHI between 1997 and 2005 is positive in almost all countries, re￿ ecting a
considerable amount of consolidation in the banking industry, be it at di⁄erent
17speeds. Column 3 and 4 show that there is again a considerable degree of
heterogeneity over countries for private bond market capitalization. However,
there is no clear relation between the relative size of the country and the
importance of its bond market. The relative stock market capitalization also
di⁄ers across countries, where the bigger countries tend to have the most
developed equity markets. The mean values of dummy bond across countries
in column 5 indicate that there is a large dispersion in terms of e⁄ective bond
market use by ￿rms, but also that bond issuing is still only a possibility for a
small number of ￿rms. Moreover, when we subdivide the ￿rms in the sample in
deciles according to market value, 66.44% of the ￿rms that have issued bonds
are larger than the 70th percentile.
The summary statistics of the ￿rm variables are presented in table 3. We
￿nd substantial cross-sectional variation in both market and book leverage.
The average leverage ratio is 26.6 percent with a median of 21.1 percent. There
is both variation across countries and across ￿rms within each country. The
summary statistics are comparable to the numbers reported in previous re-
search, predominantly with US data (Rajan and Zingales (1995), Giannetti
(2003), Flannery and Rangan (2006)). The table also shows cross-sectional
variation in the country-level variables. Our main variable of interest, HHI,
has a mean of 0.6 but an equally large standard deviation. Over the period
considered the HHI ranges from a minimum of 0.114 tot a maximum of 2.73,
indicating the co-existence of bank markets with a high and low degree of
concentration. The alternative measure for bank market concentration, CR5,
ranges from 0.17 to 0.88. The smallest countries typically have more concen-
trated banking markets. Moreover, the size of ￿rms may have an impact on
external ￿nancing behavior. If the distribution of the ￿rms according to size
18would show that the small countries have typically more small ￿rms than big
￿rms relative to big countries, there could be a size bias. Table 4 shows the
sample divided into size deciles where the size of the ￿rm is measured by its
market value. The ￿rst decile represents the smallest ￿rms and the tenth decile
the largest ￿rms. In most countries the ￿rms are relatively uniformly spread
over the deciles. This distribution of ￿rms across the countries in the sample
indicates that any ￿rm size bias should be negligible.
In table 5 the Pearson correlation matrix indicates that multicollinearity
should not be a serious problem. The correlations between leverage and the
￿rm characteristics have the expected sign and suggest that pro￿tability and
growth opportunities may be negatively correlated with leverage, while size,
tangibility and the industry median are positively correlated with leverage.
Noteworthy for our analysis, the correlations suggest that the country-level
variables may potentially in￿ uence the capital structure choice. The corre-
lation of leverage with both concentration measures is negative whereas the
measure of private bond market capitization is positive. Stock market capital-
ization is negatively correlated with market leverage. These raw correlations
do not, however, control for other characteristics.
5 Empirical results
Our base model is:
leveragei;j;t = ￿Zi;t￿1 + ￿Xj;t + ￿i + ￿t + vi;j;t (4)
19where the dependent variable is market leverage (when we use book lever-
age the results remain qualitatively unaltered). Zi;t￿1 captures the demand
side and contains all the ￿rm characteristics that are standard in the em-
pirical corporate ￿nance literature (￿xed assets, growth opportunities, size,
pro￿tability and industry median leverage). These variables are lagged to al-
leviate the endogeneity problem. Xj;t captures the supply side and contains
bank concentration or bank conduct (HHI/CR5/Lerner/Boone), private bond
market capitalization over GDP (Private Bond), the stock market capital-
ization (Stock Market Cap) or a dummy variable taking the value one from
the year onwards in which the ￿rm starts issuing bonds (Dummy Bond). We
use the subscript j to indicate that these variables, except for Dummy Bond,
are at the country level. We use panel corrected standard errors allowing for
heterogeneity at the ￿rm level (i.e. Rogers standard errors). 7 We argue that
the ￿xed e⁄ects speci￿cation is the relevant one, both from a methodological
and an economic point of view. First, including ￿rm ￿xed e⁄ects alleviates
the concern of omitted variable bias. Second, when one is interested in partial
regression coe¢ cients, holding other e⁄ects constant, what matters is whether
the e⁄ects are independent of the observed regressors or not (Arellano, 2003).
In addition, Lemmon, Roberts and Zender (2006) state that, given the im-
portance of unobserved heterogeneity in leverage, parameter estimates that
do not account for the ￿rm-speci￿c e⁄ect and serial correlation are suspect.
Therefore, we use a within transformation by incorporating ￿rm ￿xed e⁄ects
and use panel corrected standard errors allowing for heterogeneity at the ￿rm
7 We do not use the Fama-MacBeth estimation technique since Petersen (forthcom-
ing) documents that this estimation method is less suited for panels with a large
cross-section and small time series.
20level (Rogers standard errors) together with year dummies (dummy for 2005
is excluded) to control for serial correlation. Finally, ￿xed e⁄ects at the ￿rm
level also allow controlling for industry and/or country e⁄ects. Therefore, the
￿rm e⁄ects will encompass not only ￿rm-speci￿c characteristics but also those
regulatory and macroeconomic conditions in the di⁄erent countries that do
not change over time.
The determinants of leverage
Table 6 presents the basic regressions. In the ￿rst column we explain the
variation in the market leverage ratio by only including ￿rm characteristics in
order to capture the demand side of corporate ￿nancing choices. In the second
column we introduce the HHI as a measure of bank market concentration in
order to take the supply side of bank loans into account. In the third column
we also control for alternative sources of ￿nance, i.e. the bond and the stock
market. The last three columns show the results when, respectively, CR5, the
Lerner index or the Boone indicator are used as an alternative concentration
or competition measures.
The ￿rst column shows that the coe¢ cients of the ￿rm characteristics have
the expected sign and our results are broadly in line with previous ￿ndings
in the literature (Rajan and Zingales (1995), Giannetti (2003), Fama and
French (2002)). Firm pro￿tability has a negative sign and is signi￿cant. The
market-to-book ratio (proxy for growth opportunities) and depreciation have
the expected sign but they are statistically insigni￿cant. Size, tangibility and
the industry median have positive and signi￿cant coe¢ cients. These ￿ndings
remain robust throughout the di⁄erent speci￿cations, indicating that the ￿rm-
speci￿c variables capture the demand for external debt ￿nance adequately. The
21question is whether loan supply conditions, captured by the degree of bank
market concentration and its evolution over time, have a signi￿cant in￿ uence
on the ￿rms￿choice of leverage.
The second column shows that bank market concentration, measured with
the HHI, has a signi￿cantly negative e⁄ect on the observed levels of ￿rm mar-
ket leverage when included separately. In the third column, we include the
proxies for the alternatives to bank ￿nancing, the bond and stock market cap-
italization variables, but the HHI remains negative. This suggests that higher
levels of bank market concentration cause a more di¢ cult access of ￿rms to
bank loans or may even lead to some degree of credit rationing. This is consis-
tent with the market power hypothesis. Since we account for the demand side
of corporate leverage, our results imply that bank consolidation may cause
￿nancing constraints, even for the larger ￿rms in the economy. The private
bond market capitalization variable is insigni￿cant in this speci￿cation. We
have to interpret this ￿nding with caution since, even though table 2 indicates
that only a small proportion of ￿rms in Europe e⁄ectively have access to the
bond markets, it is unlikely that more developed bond markets would have
no e⁄ect on the capital structure choices of all ￿rms. Moreover, the corporate
bond market exhibited substantial growth only after the introduction of the
Euro in 1999 (we will test for this break later on). The stock market capital-
ization variable has the expected negative sign: the better developed the stock
markets are, the less ￿rms opt to hold debt.
The next three columns present the results with alternatives measures of
bank concentration. In column 4 we observe that the CR5 measure of bank
market concentration is negative and statistically signi￿cant. This corrobo-
rates the ￿ndings with the HHI, which is not unexpected given the high de-
22gree of correlation between both measures reported in table 5. In the next two
columns we include two behavioral measures for the degree of bank competi-
tion, as alternatives for the static market concentration variables. The coef-
￿cients for both the Lerner index and the Boone indicator are negative and
signi￿cant, corroborating the results for the HHI of CR5. The stock market
variable remains unaltered, whereas the bond market variables now is sig-
ni￿cantly positive, as expected. Therefore, the alternative measures for bank
market competition con￿rm the ￿nding that a less competitive bank market
structure has a negative e⁄ect on ￿rm leverage, which is consistent with the
market power hypothesis. Looking at the economic impact of higher bank
market concentration on ￿rm leverage, a change of in HHI from the mean,
576, to the 75th percentile, 1092, leads to a decrease in leverage of 4 percent-
age points. In the literature similar results have been reported (Petersen and
Rajan (1994), Zarutski (2006)).
Endogeneity
A potential problem associated with using observed changes in bank market
structure to explain di⁄erences in corporate ￿nancial structures across coun-
tries is that the market structure of the banking sector can itself be in￿ uenced
by ￿rms￿￿nancing decisions or by the development of other institutions, creat-
ing a potential endogeneity problem. While an individual ￿rm takes the market
structure of the banking sector as given, that market structure may be a⁄ected
by the aggregate decision of all ￿rms. One plausible explanation could be that
companies with higher leverage have higher investment. Hence, these compa-
nies will need more external capital, which could trigger the entry of foreign
banks in that country, thereby altering the market structure of the banking
sector. To address the endogeneity issue we re-estimate the baseline regres-
23sion using the instrumental variables approach. We follow Fan et al. (2006)
and use the size of bank deposits in a country and the amount of non-life in-
surance premiums as instruments for bank market structure. Demirg￿c-Kunt
and Maksimovic (1999) propose the country￿ s level of development and its
legal system as instruments. However, since we focus on the EU15, our sample
is very homogenous in the level of development and it characterized by strong
regulatory convergence. As an alternative, we use a dataset from Carletti,
Hartmann and Ongena (2007) who constructed indices to capture the various
dimensions of competition policy and M&As (Table 1.E). Carletti et al. (2007)
cover both the introduction of competition laws and competition authorities
as well as changes in the relative responsibilities of competition and supervi-
sory authorities in bank merger reviews. Moreover, they also document the
precise dating of the changes in competition law, allowing time variation in
the measures. Carletti et al. (2007) argue that in all cases, the introduction of
competition control constituted a signi￿cant change for the countries involved.
The IV results are presented in table 7. The ￿rst column shows results where
bank deposits, non life insurance premium volume and the competition policy
measures of Carletti et al. (2008) are used as instruments for HHI. The e⁄ect
on corporate leverage remains negative, the coe¢ cient is three times larger
than in the OLS estimations. In the second column, we include the interac-
tion between HHI and the instruments from column 1 in our instrument set;
the results are very similar to our baseline regression. The next columns show
that this result remains unaltered for our alternative measures of bank market
structure (CR5, the Lerner index and the Boone indicator). All measures con-
￿rm the negative and signi￿cant e⁄ect of bank market structure on leverage.
Overall, we can conclude that controlling for endogeneity does not alter the
results.
24Robustness
We apply a number of checks to assess the robustness of our ￿ndings. In the
￿rst three columns of table 8 we examine the stability of the results across size
classes. We split up our sample of ￿rms in quartiles based on the market value
of the ￿rms. The results for the ￿rms in the ￿rst quartile (relatively small
￿rms) are in column 1, those for the ￿rms in the second and third quartile
in column 2 and the ￿ndings for the largest ￿rms are presented in column 3.
The coe¢ cient estimates indicate that the estimated e⁄ects are not robust to
di⁄erences in size. Whereas the coe¢ cients for the ￿rms in the middle quar-
tiles are similar to those in the full sample estimation, for the quartiles with
the smallest and largest ￿rms the bank concentration variable is insigni￿cant.
While this can be expected for the largest ￿rms, since they should have eas-
ier access to bond ￿nancing, it is not clear why bank concentration would
lose signi￿cance for the smallest ￿rms. However, when we substitute the CR5,
Lerner index or Boone indicator for HHI in the ￿rst size quartile estimation,
the coe¢ cient is signi￿cant negative, as in the full sample, corroborating the
market power hypothesis. These results indicate that analyzing bank/￿rm in-
teractions for speci￿c size segments have to be treated with caution. In column
4 we introduce a more re￿ned measure to capture access of ￿rms to the bond
market. Dummy Bond is a dummy variable for those ￿rms that have issued
bonds, which takes value one starting from the year that the ￿rm taps the
bond market. The dummy variable exhibits the expected signi￿cant positive
e⁄ect of bond ￿nancing on leverage and the coe¢ cient on bank market con-
centration becomes insigni￿cant. This con￿rms the conjecture that the degree
of bank market concentration matters less for those ￿rms with e⁄ective ac-
cess to bond ￿nancing. This also implies that the further development and
25increased integration of bond markets in Europe may be an e⁄ective way of
disciplining bank behavior. In columns 5 and 6 of table 8, we examine whether
the sample selection or the introduction of the euro have an impact on our re-
sults. In column 5, we restrict the sample to ￿rms in the countries included in
Gianetti (2003) (Belgium, France, Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain
and United Kingdom). The coe¢ cients of the ￿rm characteristics are similar
to those reported in the baseline regressions. However, the HHI measure of
bank market concentration is now insigni￿cant. This shows that the result for
bank market concentration may dependent on the selection of countries. We
argue that the broader range of countries in our sample is preferable since
the larger cross-country variation in the loan supply variable should allow us
to estimate the e⁄ect on ￿rm leverage more precisely. Moreover, we use mar-
ket leverage to alleviate the problem of accounting di⁄erences in book values
of assets. In column 6, a dummy variable taking the value one after 1999 is
included. Our intention is to take the introduction of the euro in 1999 and
the subsequent development and gradual integration of ￿nancial markets into
account. This procedure addresses the concern that there might be a struc-
tural break in the sample. We also interact this dummy with the concentration
measure. The ￿ Euro￿dummy turns out to be positive and signi￿cant indicat-
ing that European ￿rms increased their leverage after 1999. Whether or not
this can be fully attributed to the Euro cannot be established from this sim-
ple exercise, since it is also possible that business cycle e⁄ects or changes in
interest rate conditions may have contributed. The interaction term with HHI
is insigni￿cant, indicating that there is no additional e⁄ect on leverage that
was not already captured by bank market structure itself. However, the bank
market concentration variable remains negative and signi￿cant, as in the base-
line regressions. In the ￿nal column of table 8 we include the relative presence
26of foreign banks to account for the contestability of national bank markets.
As we expect, this measure has a signi￿cant positive impact, suggesting that
companies ￿nd it easier to get external ￿nance in countries where there is
more bank entry. However, the e⁄ect of contestability does not compensate
the e⁄ect of bank concentration; on the contrary, the e⁄ect of bank market
concentration becomes even more pronounced.
Table 9 contains a number of additional speci￿cations to account for eco-
nomic or methodological concerns. In the ￿rst column we include measures
capturing the macroeconomic conditions (GDP growth and in￿ ation) because
they may in￿ uence the willingness of banks to lend. The coe¢ cient for bank
market concentration remains negative and signi￿cant. In the speci￿cation re-
ported in the second column of table 9, we run the baseline regression, but
exclude those ￿rms which have a zero debt ratio because this choice may be
driven by totally di⁄erent motivations. All results remain unaltered and the
signi￿cance of the HHI becomes stronger. The next two columns contain two
interaction e⁄ects. The interaction e⁄ect of bank concentration with collateral
is insigni￿cant. The interaction with size has a signi￿cant positive e⁄ect, but
the negative e⁄ect of bank concentration becomes stronger, hence a larger ￿rm
size can only partially alleviate the ￿nancial constrainedness. In column 5 of
table 9, we lag the supply variables but the results from the base regression
carry over. The ￿nal speci￿cation in table 9 reports the results from a dynamic
estimation as in Flannery and Rangan (2006). This accounts for the argument
that ￿rms may face adjustment costs when changing their level of leverage.
The lagged leverage variable is instrumented with lagged book leverage and
the ￿rm characteristics. Although this procedure constitutes only a ￿rst step
in applying dynamic estimation, the results for the bank market concentration
27measure remain qualitatively unaltered.
6 Conclusions
Credit constraints imposed by banks on ￿rms may hamper economic growth.
In this paper we examine whether or not changes in the market structure of
European bank markets a⁄ect the access of non-￿nancial ￿rms to bank ￿nance.
More speci￿cally, we investigate the relationship between the degree of concen-
tration of European bank markets and the capital structure of non-￿nancial
￿rms. In our empirical investigation we confront the information-based and the
market power theories, using panel data of 3364 listed ￿rms from the EU15
over the period 1997-2005. During the last decade, the European banking
sector has been characterized by a wave of mergers and acquisitions, predom-
inantly in the form of domestic consolidation, leading to a marked increase
in the measured level of market concentration in most European countries.
Simultaneously, the European bond and stock markets have witnessed a rapid
development and a gradually increasing degree of integration since the intro-
duction of the Euro. These developments in the bank and ￿nancial markets
make the period under consideration, 1997-2005, and the geographical scope
(EU15) particularly interesting to investigate the impact of the evolving mar-
ket structure of ￿nancial intermediaries on external ￿nancing decisions by
non-￿nancial ￿rms.
Overall, our results lend empirical support to the market power hypothesis.
We ￿nd a negative and signi￿cant relationship between the degree of concen-
tration of European bank markets and the market leverage of non-￿nancial
￿rms. A change in HHI of 100 would lead to a decrease in leverage of 0.8
28percent, which is in line with the results found for SMEs (Petersen and Ra-
jan (1994), Zarutskie (2006)). As the mean over the countries is 576 and the
75th percentile is 1092, a change from the mean to the 75th percentile would
mean a drop in leverage of 4%. When we substitute the static bank market
structure variables for indicators of bank competition based on the observed
behavior of banks, the results remain unaltered. Since we control for endoge-
niety, alternative sources of external ￿nance and for the ￿rm-speci￿c factors
driving the demand for leverage, we are con￿dent that these ￿ndings re￿ ect
a supply-side e⁄ect, implying that the ongoing consolidation of bank markets
may impose an external debt ￿nance constraint on non-￿nancial ￿rms. Our re-
sults are not consistent with the information-based hypothesis since we ￿nd no
evidence that banks in more concentrated markets tend to engage in relation-
ship lending, not even with the listed ￿rms in our sample. One possibility for
￿rms would be to use the increasing competition between banks and ￿nancial
markets to obtain more favorable ￿nancing conditions. Our ￿nding that ￿rms
with e⁄ective access to the bond market are less constrained in their choice of
leverage point in this direction. In any case our results imply that the ongoing
(domestic) consolidation of the banking industry in Europe can potentially
hamper the access of ￿rms to bank ￿nancing. From a policy perspective, this
calls for renewed e⁄orts to increase the contestability and integration of bank
lending markets in Europe.
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35Table 1
Definitions of the variables
Variable Definition Source
Market value of the firm /                   
Size of the firm
share price * outstanding shares + 
loans (debt for less than one year) + 
longtermdebt (debt for more than 
one year)
Amadeus + Datastream
Market leverage loans + long term debt / market 
value of the firm
Amadeus + Datastream
Book leverage loans + long term debt / total assets. Amadeus
Profitability Ebit / total assets Amadeus
Growth opportunties Market value of firm / total assets Amadeus + Datastream
Depreciation Depreciation / total assets Amadeus
Tangibility Fixed tangible assets / total assets Amadeus
Median industry leverage The firm's industry median debt ratio 
(using the Fama and French industry 
classification)
Amadeus
HHI the sum of the squares of the credit 
institutions' market shares, 
according to total assets
ECB
CR5 the share of the 5 largest credit 
institutions in total assets in each 
country
ECB
Lerner (price – marginal cost)/price . The 
index can take values between 0 
and 1, where zero stands for perfect 
competition and 1 for monopoly 
power. 
Fernández De Guevara and Maudos 
(2004)
Boone indicator assumes that competition enhances 
the performance of efficient frims. 
The stronger competition is, the 
more negative the Boone indicator 
must be.
van Luevensteijn, Bikker, van Rixtel 
and Kok-Sørensen (2007)
Private Bond the ratio of private domestic debt 
securities issued by financial 
institutions and corporations as a 
share of GDP
World Bank
Dummy bond dummy variable which has value one 
starting from the year that the firm 
issues a bond
Datastream
Stock Market Cap the value of listed shares to GDP World Bank
B. Measures of bank market structure
A. Firm specific variables
C. Alternative sources of external financeTable 1 Continued
Definitions of the variables
Variable Definition Source
GDP Growth IMF IFS
Inflation IMF IFS
Contestability The share of total assets of foreign 
branches and subsiduaries relative 
to the total assets of the whole 
banking sector in that particular 
country
ECB
Bank Deposits Demand, time and saving deposits 
in deposit money banks as a share 
of GDP
World Bank
Non-life Insurance Nonlife insurance premium volume 
as a share of GDP
World Bank
Competition policy - criteria Index ranging from 0 to 1 using 
assessment criteria that are used 
in competition control
Carletti, Hartmann and Ongena (2007)
Competition policy - control Index ranging from 0 to 1 using 
who is (are) the decision-making 
agency(ies) for competition control
Carletti, Hartmann and Ongena (2007)
Competition policy - third party Index ranging from 0 to 1 using if a 
third agency can intervene in the 
process to replace/overturn the 
decision-making agency(ies)
Carletti, Hartmann and Ongena (2007)
Competition policy - notification Index ranging from 0 to 1 using if 
merger notification is mandatory 
above (statutory) thresholds
Carletti, Hartmann and Ongena (2007)
D. Robustness variables
E. Instrumenting variablesTable 2
  For the two concentration measures, the first column states the mean for the period 1997-2005, 
  the second column the percentage change between 1997 and 2005.
  HHI and CR5 are both from the ECB. Private bond and Stock Market Capitalization are from the Financial Development and Structure
  database of the World Bank. Dummy Bond is a dummy variable which has value one starting form the year that the firm issues a bond.
Private bond Stock Market cap Dummy Bond
mean change mean change mean mean mean
  Austria 0.55 9 0.44 2 0.34 0.17 0.06
  Belgium 1.62 202 0.76 57 0.45 0.76 0.11
  Finland 2.28 27 0.83 -6 0.24 1.3 0.07
  France 0.57 69 0.46 35 0.41 0.77 0.16
  Germany 0.16 53 0.2 29 0.5 0.48 0.12
  Greece 1.09 24 0.65 18 0.01 0.66 0.02
  Ireland  0.57 20 0.45 12 0.23 0.58 0.06
  Italy 0.24 14 0.27 8 0.38 0.46 0.15
  Netherlands 1.74 9 0.83 8 0.47 1.21 0.19
  Portugal 0.86 100 0.56 50 0.23 0.41 0.03
  Spain 0.48 71 0.42 31 0.17 0.65 0.08
  Sweden 0.8 2 0.56 -2 0.42 1.09 0.06
  U.K. 0.3 92 0.3 50 0.17 1.46 0.18
  Total 0.59 53 0.42 23 0.29 0.99 0.14
HHI CR5Table 3
Summary statistics
  Sample includes all non-financial listed firms from Amadeus (except NACE Rev. 1.1 65 - 67) which have market in data in Datastream with two
  or more adjacent years during 1997-2005. Total : 3664 firms, 19735 firm years. All variables are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles
  to avoid the influence of extreme observations.
Number of Mean Median Std. Dev Min. Max.
Observations
  Market Leverage 19735 0.27 0.21 0.23 0 0.89
  Book Leverage 19735 0.23 0.2 0.18 0 0.79
  Profitability 19735 0.03 0.06 0.17 -0.98 0.33
  Growth Opportunities 19735 1.27 0.89 1.32 0.18 10.33
  Depreciation 19735 0.05 0.04 0.05 0 0.3
  Size 19735 18.93 18.73 1.98 14.33 24.11
  Tangibility 19735 0.29 0.23 0.23 0 0.95
  Industry Median 19735 0.21 0.2 0.1 0.03 0.43
  HHI 117 0.61 0.4 0.53 0.11 2.73
  CR5 117 0.42 0.36 0.19 0.17 0.88
  Lerner 46 0.17 0.05 0.18 0.09 0.27
  Boone 31 -2.53 -1.69 2.84 -9.36 0.63
  Private Bond 117 0.29 0.23 0.16 0 0.68
  Dummy Bond 19735 0.14 0 0.34 0 1
  Stock Market Capitalization 117 1.04 0.99 0.48 0.14 2.7
  GDP Growth 117 2.58 2.7 1.27 -0.7 9.4
  Inflation 117 1.83 1.76 0.89 0.14 5.43
  ContestabilityTable 4
Distribution of firms by total assets (percentage)
  All firms are pooled and they are placed in deciles according ot their market value. Decile 1 has the smallest firms, decile 10 the largest.
Decile
  Country 123456789 1 0 #  o f  firms
  Austria 1.1 10.2 12.5 17.0 9.1 9.1 5.7 9.1 20.5 5.7 19
  Belgium 6.3 5.3 11.3 15.3 14.4 10.6 11.8 7.9 9.5 7.6 78
  Finland 9.4 8.8 13.5 11.7 9.4 8.5 9.0 12.4 11.5 5.5 104
  France 13.9 12.6 10.5 9.0 8.9 9.7 8.6 8.3 9.5 8.9 564
  Germany 8.5 10.8 11.1 11.4 11.4 11.0 8.9 9.3 7.3 10.3 483
  Greece 7.7 10.5 14.6 14.2 14.5 12.6 10.8 7.4 5.4 2.3 271
  Ireland 22.6 9.7 16.1 8.1 14.5 0.0 3.2 4.8 6.5 14.5 19
  Italy 0.3 4.4 5.2 9.1 13.8 13.6 14.0 13.9 11.8 13.9 159
  Netherlands 5.2 5.3 7.4 8.8 8.2 9.3 9.0 13.4 17.1 16.3 134
  Portugal 15.6 10.1 8.6 5.8 10.4 13.1 8.6 8.3 7.0 12.5 50
  Spain 0.7 1.5 4.4 4.7 8.6 11.5 11.8 15.0 18.4 23.3 99
  Sweden 14.1 11.9 10.0 11.3 9.6 9.9 7.5 8.7 8.4 8.5 235
  United Kingdom 11.0 10.3 9.1 9.0 8.7 8.8 11.0 10.6 10.7 10.7 1,149Table 5
Correlation matrix
  The table provides Pearson correlation coefficients
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] [9] [10] [11]
  Market Leverage [1] 1
  Book Leverage [2] 0.8357 1
  Size [3] 0.2321 0.2082 1
  Profitability [4] -0.1952 -0.103 0.2198 1
  Growth Opportunities [5] -0.4797 -0.017 -0.1075 0.2284 1
  Depreciation [6] -0.0097 0.0077 -0.0778 -0.0967 0.0331 1
  Tangibility [7] 0.3056 0.2918 0.2274 0.089 -0.1112 0.211 1
  Industry Median [8] 0.334 0.2407 0.1835 0.0276 -0.2663 -0.1029 0.3268 1
  HHI [9] -0.0226 -0.0078 -0.0607 0.0224 0.0316 -0.0402 -0.0968 0.0548 1
  CR5 [10] -0.0232 -0.0096 -0.0544 0.0218 0.0299 -0.0406 -0.0985 0.0569 0.9972 1
  Lerner [11] -0.0848 -0.0351 -0.0839 -0.0247 0.0952 -0.1303 0.0854 0.0361 -0.0452 -0.0523 1
  Boone [12] -0.0794 -0.0854 -0.1539 0.0716 0.0086 -0.1001 -0.2086 0.0031 0.804 0.8208 -0.0587
  Private Bond [13] 0.0997 0.0117 0.0975 -0.02 -0.1682 0.2158 -0.0581 -0.0324 -0.0758 -0.065 -0.5639
  Dummy Bond [14] 0.1302 0.139 0.3614 0.0333 -0.0337 -0.0395 0.0847 0.0637 -0.059 -0.0582 -0.0017
  Stock Market Cap [15] -0.1517 -0.0548 -0.0543 0.0699 0.2036 -0.0798 0.0661 -0.1413 -0.0286 -0.0354 0.6939
  GDP Growth [16] -0.0968 -0.0038 -0.0396 0.106 0.1821 -0.1744 0.0678 -0.051 0.2615 0.2564 0.1065
  Inflation [17] 0.0286 0.0285 -0.0044 -0.0101 -0.0085 -0.0822 -0.0658 0.095 0.4058 0.4196 -0.0375
  Contestability [18] -0.0759 -0.001 -0.0979 0.0443 0.1467 -0.1569 0.0734 -0.0654 -0.1456 -0.1667 0.5975
[12] [13] [14] [15] [16] [17] [18]
  Boone [12] 1
  Private Bond [13] -0.2113 1
  Dummy Bond [14] 0.0593 0.0065 1
  Stock Market Cap [15] 0.6108 -0.3341 0.0718 1
  GDP Growth [16] 0.1854 -0.4764 -0.0398 0.3431 1
  Inflation [17] 0.3252 -0.1606 -0.062 -0.3193 -0.0632 1
  Contestability [18] 0.7083 -0.6658 0.0627 0.6099 0.3266 -0.2261 1Table 6
Baseline regression
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6]
CR5 Lerner Boone
Profitability -0.175 -0.173 -0.172 -0.173 -0.135 -0.257
[10.55]** [10.44]** [10.36]** [10.41]** [4.74]** [7.27]**
Growth Opportunities -0.012 -0.012 -0.012 -0.012 -0.007 -0.013
[9.42]** [9.31]** [9.22]** [9.25]** [3.05]** [6.31]**
Depreciation 0 0.002 -0.001 -0.003 0.11 0.069
[0.01] [0.04] [0.01] [0.06] [1.10] [0.74]
Size 0.033 0.032 0.032 0.032 0.001 0.054
[6.40]** [6.32]** [6.27]** [6.37]** [0.20] [5.87]**
Tangibility 0.146 0.148 0.149 0.146 0.107 0.096
[5.99]** [6.05]** [6.09]** [5.99]** [4.06]** [2.33]*
Industry Median 0.224 0.227 0.23 0.226 0.131 0.117









Private Bond -0.002 -0.005 0.44 0.159
[0.06] [0.14] [6.35]** [3.42]**
Stock Market Cap -0.027 -0.022 -0.051 -0.331
[2.67]** [2.13]* [3.43]** [7.22]**
Observations 19735 19735 19735 19735 7002 6606
Number of group (firm) 3364 3364 3364 3364 2377 1305
R-squared 0.14 0.14 0.14 0.15 0.14 0.22
Robust t statistics in brackets
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%
  Estimation methods for specification (4)
  The model: leverage_{i,j,t}=αZ_{i,t-1}+βX_{j,t}+η_{i}+δ_{t}+v_{i,j,t}
  All regressions include firm fixed effects and year dummies (dummy for 2005 is excluded) 
  and have standard errors which are corrected for heteroskedasticity, and clustering at the
  firm level (Rogers standard errors)
  The firm characteristics are lagged one period to alleviate problems of endogeneity.
HHITable 7
Endogeneity
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5]
CR5 Lerner Boone
Profitability -0.163 -0.167 -0.169 -0.124 -0.26
(10.68)** (10.98)** (11.06)** (4.19)** (6.64)**
Growth Opportunities -0.011 -0.012 -0.012 -0.007 -0.013
(9.21)** (9.70)** (9.73)** (2.79)** (5.79)**
Depreciation 0 -0.004 -0.006 0.092 0.089
-0.01 -0.08 -0.11 -0.86 -0.9
Size 0.03 0.031 0.032 0.006 0.058
(6.28)** (6.52)** (6.68)** -0.72 (6.05)**
Tangibility 0.152 0.15 0.145 0.113 0.094
(6.60)** (6.58)** (6.40)** (4.08)** (2.17)*
Industry Median 0.253 0.245 0.24 0.144 0.13









Private Bond -0.025 -0.017 -0.032 0.474 0.165
-0.72 -0.5 -0.9 (5.66)** (3.35)**
Stock Market Cap -0.049 -0.034 -0.029 -0.054 -0.315
(3.81)** (3.55)** (3.01)** (3.42)** (6.65)**
Observations 18700 18700 18700 5344 5843
Number of group (firm) 3356 3356 3356 1738 1282
R-squared 0.13 0.14 0.14 0.16 0.23
Robust t statistics in brackets
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%
  Endogeneity results for specification (4)
  The model: leverage_{i,j,t}=αZ_{i,t-1}+βX_{j,t}+η_{i}+δ_{t}+v_{i,j,t}
  All regressions include firm fixed effects and year dummies (dummy for 2005 is excluded) 
  and have standard errors which are corrected for heteroskedasticity, and clustering at the
  firm level (Rogers standard errors)
  The firm characteristics are lagged one period to alleviate problems of endogeneity.
  All regressions are estimated using IV to instrument bank market structure
  [1] the insturmentset includes bank deposits / GDP, non life insurance premium volume / GDP 
       and the competition policy measures of Carletti et al. (2008)
  [2]-[5] the insturmentset includes bank deposits / GDP, non life insurance premium volume / GDP 
       and the competition policy measures of Carletti et al. (2008) plus the interaction of the bank market
       structure measure with the aforementioned instruments
HHITable 8
Robustness
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7]
Profitability -0.105 -0.153 -0.162 -0.31 -0.168 -0.172 -0.172
[4.48]** [6.79]** [3.66]** [5.84]** [8.53]** [10.35]** [11.38]**
Growth Opportunities -0.005 -0.005 -0.003 -0.013 -0.011 -0.012 -0.012
[1.51] [3.27]** [1.77] [3.33]** [6.86]** [9.22]** [10.01]**
Depreciation 0.07 -0.136 -0.114 0.118 0.043 -0.001 0.003
[0.73] [1.71] [0.97] [0.69] [0.65] [0.01] [0.06]
Size 0.064 0.058 0.042 0.046 0.032 0.032 0.032
[4.90]** [7.59]** [4.86]** [3.78]** [5.73]** [6.27]** [6.83]**
Tangibility 0.139 0.131 0.102 0.054 0.13 0.149 0.148
[3.22]** [3.82]** [2.55]* [0.79] [4.67]** [6.10]** [6.70]**
Industry Median 0.017 0.287 0.105 0.198 0.156 0.23 0.218
[0.17] [5.46]** [1.76] [2.32]* [3.65]** [5.69]** [6.01]**
HHI -0.055 -0.084 0.011 -0.034 0.008 -0.09 -0.127
[1.43] [4.06]** [0.40] [0.93] [0.37] [4.81]** [7.19]**
Private Bond -0.141 0.059 0.108 0.169 -0.003 0.015
[1.44] [1.16] [1.97]* [3.50]** [0.09] [0.48]
Stock Market Cap 0.003 -0.034 0.001 0.028 0.009 -0.028 -0.018









Observations 5229 9237 5269 3175 13552 19735 19735
Number of group (firm) 1499 2246 1131 479 2252 3364 3364
R-squared 0.09 0.17 0.19 0.23 0.14 0.14 0.15
Robust t statistics in brackets
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%
  Robustness results for specification (4)
  The model: leverage_{i,j,t}=αZ_{i,t-1}+βX_{j,t}+η_{i}+δ_{t}+v_{i,j,t}
  The dependent variable is market leverage
  All regressions include firm fixed effects and year dummies (dummy for 2005 is excluded) 
  and have standard errors which are corrected for heteroskedasticity, and clustering at the
  firm level (Rogers standard errors)
  The firm characteristics are lagged one period to alleviate problems of endogeneity.
  [1]-[3] check for stability across size where [1] are the firms in quartile 1 of total assets,
     [2] firms in quartile 2 + 3 and [3] firms in quartile 4
  [4] uses only those firms that have issued a bond
  [5] uses the sample of countries of Giannetti
  [6] the introduction of the euro
  [7] control for contestabilityTable 9
Robustness continued
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6]
Lagged Market Leverage 0.526
[32.30]**
Profitability -0.173 -0.193 -0.172 -0.17 -0.177 -0.101
[10.41]** [10.55]** [10.37]** [10.24]** [9.46]** [7.90]**
Growth Opportunities -0.012 -0.014 -0.012 -0.012 -0.011 0
[9.29]** [9.33]** [9.24]** [9.27]** [6.92]** [0.30]
Depreciation 0.009 0.017 -0.001 0.007 -0.046 -0.029
[0.15] [0.27] [0.02] [0.12] [0.70] [0.64]
Size 0.034 0.03 0.032 0.021 0.031 0.008
[6.58]** [5.70]** [6.29]** [3.55]** [4.94]** [2.24]*
Tangibility 0.145 0.133 0.12 0.151 0.134 0.053
[5.95]** [5.30]** [3.63]** [6.16]** [4.79]** [3.30]**
Industry Median 0.237 0.226 0.231 0.224 0.235 0.009
[5.87]** [5.46]** [5.70]** [5.54]** [5.11]** [0.35]
HHI -0.086 -0.096 -0.107 -0.466 -0.076 -0.051





Private Bond -0.003 -0.002 0.001 -0.009 0.076 0.065
[0.08] [0.07] [0.04] [0.27] [1.74] [3.06]**
Stock Market Cap -0.037 -0.029 -0.026 -0.03 -0.023 -0.028





Observations 19735 18613 19735 19735 16181 19735
Number of group (firm) 3364 3301 3364 3364 3364 3364
R-squared 0.15 0.16 0.14 0.15 0.14
Robust t statistics in brackets
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%
  Robustness results for specification (4)
  The model: leverage_{i,j,t}=αZ_{i,t-1}+βX_{j,t}+η_{i}+δ_{t}+v_{i,j,t}
  All regressions include firm fixed effects and year dummies (dummy for 2005 is excluded) 
  and have standard errors which are corrected for heteroskedasticity, and clustering at the
  firm level (Rogers standard errors)
  The firm characteristics are lagged one period to alleviate problems of endogeneity.
  [1] controls for the macro economy
  [2] only firms which have debt
  [3] interaction of bank concentration with collateral
  [4] interaction of bank concentration with size
  [5] lagged bank concentration, bond market and stock market
  [6] a dynamic specification where lagged market leverage is instrumented with lagged book leverage
  and the other variables in the regression (firm characteristics, HHI, Bond Market 
  and Stock Market Capitalization)